public goods or co-option. To the contrary, this "promotion machine" produces additional rents for the incumbent rulers. The prospect of promotion creates an incentive for aspirants to rent-paying positions to expend extra effort in a capacity as informant, voluntary supervisor in the workplace, or a member of paramilitary. These types of service increase the rulers' rents. Mature hierarchical regimes seem to value supervisory services. The current Constitution of the Communist Party of China, for example, establishes that "party members must… lead the masses to work hard to bring about economic development and social progress; and play an exemplary, vanguard role in production… and social life"; "cadres who have made exceptional achievements" are selected for promotion.
2 Similarly, the Soviet propaganda in the past emphasized that joining the party essentially meant more effort and additional duties, including supervision over fellow workers, while promotion to a position in the party bureaucracy or industrial management could follow in the future. 3 Any successful career is preceded 2 Voluntary supervisory agents may seem redundant under the contemporary market arrangements in the Chinese economy. Biographical sketches of the delegates of the last congress of CPC (see above)
do emphasize that this is not true. Even in a private foreign-owned enterprise, party activists are supposed to do what the party constitution requires: work in the best interest of the enterprise and encourage coworkers to do the same. The reasoning behind this must be that the government will benefit from better performance by every tax-paying unit.
3 A Soviet sociological review purports: "Once you become a communist, you assume voluntarily an additional heavy duty to lead the others." A characteristic career path of a new working-class party recruit is described in the following manner: foreman -student in an engineering school -head of the planning department in a large enterprise. The next step would be further up the ladder of industrial management or to an entry-level position in the party bureaucracy. Eighty percent of the Soviet party bureaucrats of the 1970s followed this career path (Rabochii klass SSSR. 1966 -1970 . 1979 . Nauka, Moskva [Working class of the USSR in 1966 ). Biographies of the current generation of Chinese party leaders (available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/44526.htm) seem to suggest a somewhat different career trajectory: education first, the beginning of party career is close in time to the beginning of the professional career.
by, and possibly overlaps with, a period of activist service in the workplace or wherever the party calls for it, which makes it a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for future promotion.
It is convenient to model hierarchy as being composed of two layers. The first layer, "bosses", consists of the holders of governing positions such as state and party bureaucracy, military command, etc. The second larger layer, "activists," consists of the aspirants to the governing positions. 4 The bosses' salaries and benefits greatly exceed the wages of ordinary workers by far, while the activists retain ordinary low-paid jobs. The activists are required to "pay dues", which may include but are not limited to a monetary component (Belova and Lazarev 2007) . More importantly, these dues include additional services, in particular, supervisory services, performed for the bosses' benefit. The bosses enter an implicit contract with activists, according to which the activists pay "dues" in exchange for the prospect of promotion. As long as the activist is on a career track, he has an incentive to support the regime. If the regime changes, the investment in activist service is lost. The promotion contract therefore creates a nexus between the economic incentives and the political stability of the regime. In contrast, simple cash transfers to a group of the population or on the spot purchase of the activists' services do not assume any investment into the future stability of the regime.
5
In the short run, the costs of this arrangement are borne by the activists. Formal admittance to the hierarchy (party, army, etc.) does not immediately make them better off. To the contrary, their 4 Formal attributes of the two groups vary across political systems and can change over time. For example, in the early period of the Soviet regime, the distinction between "party candidates" -new recruits on probation -and the "full" party members drew the formal line. As the party was growing, the class of actual activists came to include part of rank-and-file full party members. However, the relative positions of the two groups did not change over time.
positions yield lower utility than that of an ordinary worker. In the long run, the bosses bear their share of costs by retiring and thus creating vacancies to be filled by promoted activists. Incentives for the incumbents to enter the promotion contract are determined by the costs and benefits of the activists' services: the extra rents produced by the activists versus the rents forgone by the bosses due to retirement in compliance with the contract. Without the promotion contract, the bosses expect to receive rents longer, possibly indefinitely if they are hereditary autocrats or private proprietors, but lose the extra rents produced by the activists. A regime without a promotion contract -a competitive regime based on private property rights -is an outside option for the bosses. Under certain conditions in the political labor market, such outside option may potentially yield greater net benefits than the existing hierarchical regime, prompting rational bosses to initiate a regime change. At the same time, the presence of an outside option (e.g., shadow economy or emigration) may divert potential activists from the political labor market. This would further reduce the extra rents produced by the activists, thus prompting a regime change.
The effectiveness of the loyal-service-for-promotion exchange depends on the extent to which the rulers are capable of controlling the sources of income and, by the same token, the paths of upward job mobility. All dictatorships seek to control access to high-income positions via appointments in the public sector, licensing businesses, and regulating access to higher education, to name a few examples.
Communist states of the twentieth century created the most favorable conditions for such control by establishing a near monopoly on the ownership of productive capital. In the Soviet Union, for example, the nomenklatura system of job assignment, run by the ruling party, provided an institutional mechanism for awarding "promotion tickets" in exchange for loyal service. The nomenklatura was practically the only way up for a contender. 6 The absolute monopsony in the political labor market, as in the case of the Soviet Union, simplifies empirical analyses. Moreover, relevant data from the Soviet Union, including formerly top-secret materials from the Communist party archives, are now available to researchers. For these reasons, the proposed model is tested using data from the former Soviet Union for the period from 1956 to 1968.
Explaining the dynamics of modern dictatorships and democratic transitions, including the outstanding phenomenon of the rapid and peaceful demise of the Soviet Union, calls for a deeper research in the operation of political-economic hierarchies. While the long-run dynamics a hierarchical regime is discussed in Lazarev (2005) , this paper focuses on the equilibrium in the political labor market where services and political support of activists are "borrowed" in exchange for deferred promotion into the ruling stratum. The model developed in this paper rests on the notion of implicit promotion contract between the incumbents and contenders and implies that the stability of a hierarchical regime -contrary to a segregated non-democracy -is consistent with large income gaps between the rulers and the rest of the population. It is also consistent with active government investment in state-managed productive assets.
Empirical analysis produces results that are consistent with the theoretical predictions by the implicit-promotion contract model. The supply of activists, expressed as the number of party candidates, is positively affected by the size of the income gap between the party bureaucracy and workers. Investment in physical capital, which increases the return on activists' services, also positively affects the equilibrium number of activists and therefore increases the regime's stability.
Indicators of the provision of public goods have either no or negative effect on the support for the regime. These findings are in agreement with earlier empirical studies of conventional dictatorships (Feng and Zak, 1999; Barro, 1999) , which suggests that the model underlying this study could be applicable to a broader class of non-democratic regimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces a model of implicit contract between the incumbent rent-maximizing rulers and rent-seeking activists, analyzes the characteristics of the equilibrium in the political labor market and establishes the limits of a regime's sustainability.
The empirical data used in this study are described in Section III. Tests of the proposed model using data from several former Soviet states are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Promotion Contract: A Theoretical Model

Model Setup
Let us consider a population with size normalized to unity that consists of two groups: bosses and workers. The bosses' incomes are political rents. Individual rents are identical and equal R. The rest of the population, comprised of the workers and the retired bosses, earn a uniform wage, W, which is substantially lower than the political rent: W <<R. A part of the working population, the activists, provide additional services that benefit the bosses by increasing their rents: R = f(N a ) > R 0 > 0, where f(N a ) is the activists' "rent-production function" such that f′(N a ) ≥ 0 and f′′(N a ) ≤ 0; and R 0 is the basic rent -the bosses' potential per capita rent in the absence of activists 7 . N a is the number of activists as a share of the working population. Both R 0 and W are positive and assumed exogenous. 8 The bosses and 7 R 0 measures the rulers' own productivity in rent-collection. R 0 is generally greater than zero, since a rational worker will not fight corruption or resist predatory taxation as long as his losses do not exceed the perceived cost of enforcing the rule of law.
8 A singular monopsonistic boss/dictator, who combines political and economic power, could endogenize the wage. However, the division of responsibility within a sizeable ruling elite makes it virtually impossible to align the contract design by political leaders with wage setting decisions by production managers. Even in the highly centralized Soviet command economy of the 1930s, the government was unable to fully eliminate the managerial discretion (Belova and Gregory 2002) .
Moreover, the government itself may find it beneficial to increase wages occasionally to stimulate higher worker productivity (Gregory 2005 
The population is homogeneous with respect to all other behavioral parameters. In particular, all agents are risk-neutral and discount the future exponentially at the rate r.
The implicit contract between the bosses and the activists offers the participating activists a possibility of promotion into a boss position after T a years of service and limits the bosses' tenures to T b years in order to facilitate promotion. The probability of promotion is π. Activists who do not obtain promotion rejoin the ranks of ordinary workers. 10 There is no outside option for a worker: the only way to achieve a level of income exceeding W lies on the activist-boss career track. T b is not bounded from above explicitly, but T b exceeding the life expectancy is essentially equivalent to the elite becoming hereditary. The promotion contract cannot be sustained in this range of boss tenures.
Similar to the dictator in the model of economic growth under dictatorship (Overland et al. 2005) , bosses are assumed to maximize the present value of their lifetime income (rents). We extend the same approach to model activists, taking into account the negative value (disutility) of the activist 9 Realistic values of N a and N b are of the order 10 -2 ÷ 10 -3 (a share of one percent to a few percent of the total population). See Section III for a discussion.
10 Promotion does not have to be random. Rational bosses are likely to resort to a sort of rank-order wage tournament (Lazear and Rosen 1981) to elicit more activist effort and select the most able activists. In the present context, however, it is sufficient to assume that promotion is random for a beginner activist perspective. In fact, keeping the rules secret can help eliciting extra effort from the agents and maximize accumulation of political rents (Lazarev and Gregory 2003, Harrison 2004) .
service. The contract satisfies the participation constraints as long as (a) the activist's disutility is compensated by the expected rent after the end of service and (b) extra rents due to activist services compensate incumbent bosses for the loss of rents after retirement. In the absence of contract-based exchange between the bosses and the working population, the bosses never retire (T b is infinite) and acquire the basic rent, R 0 , forever, while the workers earn W forever.
In setting the terms of the contract, the bosses behave as a single entity -the representative boss. The contract designed by the incumbent representative boss is offered to every worker who is not yet (and has never been) an activist. Although the boss dictates the terms of the contract to the activists, he cannot force a worker to enlist as an activist and has to choose the contract terms in anticipation of known voluntary response from the workers, given the chosen values of T a , T b , and π; and the exogenous wage, W. The optimal contract is therefore a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the bossactivists strategic interaction where the boss is the prime mover. The contract is life-long; once written, it is supposed to be non-renegotiable. However, the terms of contracts offered to successive cohorts of activists may differ.
Equilibrium in the Political Labor Market
The choice problem facing an individual worker involves a comparison of returns to strategies. The supply of activists -the number of workers for whom ω i < ω * holds under a given contract -is then the left tail of the distribution of the disutility from the activist service:
Without the loss of generality, we can use the first-order approximation of (3) Let us measure time in units of the term of activist service, T a , so that T a ≡ 1.
12 Then the supply of activists is expressed as:
It can be easily verified that the supply of activists increases in the boss rent, tenure, and the probability of promotion, and decreases in the workers' wage:
This result is hardly surprising. It tells us that the willingness to become an activist is positively affected by the expected rent, which is the product of boss rent, tenure, and the probability of promotion. It is negatively affected by the value of the alternative to the activist-boss career track represented by the worker's wage.
At the core of the representative boss's choice problem is the tradeoff between additional rents provided by the activists and the limitation of tenure that the provision of incentives for the activists implies. By entering the contract with the activists, the bosses seek to maximize the present value of the residual lifetime rent:
To achieve this goal, they choose the probability of promotion, π, and the length of tenure, T b , taking into account the workers' response expressed in the form of the supply of activists (4). An additional stationarity constraint to their problem results from the necessity to balance the inflow of promoted activists and retiring bosses:
To simplify further analysis, let us combine the two constraints, by plugging (7) into (4) and rearranging the terms:
where ∆R = R -W is the boss premium. In essence, (8) is the general form of the activists participation constraint that takes into account that the parameters of a sustainable promotion contract are not independent but are subject to the stationarity constraint (7). The representative boss's problem is then:
The bosses' objective function (6) (12) is binding, the bosses are indifferent between maintaining the contract and the regime change. The location of the boundary optimal contract is determined by the productivity of activists captured by the parameters of the function, f ().
Formal analysis is given in Mathematical Appendix (A).
To analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium in the political labor market, let us note that the first-order condition to problem (9) can be represented in the following form:
If we denote the left-hand side of (13) bosses' ability to design the optimal contract and commit to its terms by retiring and promoting the activists.
15 The three derivatives above should therefore be jointly interpreted as a positive effect of the expected rent on the equilibrium number of activists under a stationary hierarchical regime. In this context, high and rising inequality is consistent with the regime stability. Persistent, substantial, and apparent income gap between the ruling elite and the working population in Stalin's Soviet Union and in China today seem to support this conclusion. 15 A discussion of the causes and consequences of deviations from the optimal contract as it applies to the dynamic of the Soviet Communist party can be found in Lazarev (2005) . 16 It is well known that Soviet type economies extend centralized administrative allocation far beyond the healthcare, housing and other markets where democratic governments also tend to intervene (see Gregory and Harrison (2005) for a survey of allocation in the Stalinist economy). The governmental control of consumer markets complements the control over appointments. Both types of control served primarily political purposes. Lazarev and Gregory (2003) , for example, show in the Soviet Union of the 1930s, political motives lied behind the patterns of administrative allocation of cars.
An Extension: Production with Activists-supervisors and Economic Policy
The analysis above produces certain important comparative statics results without making any restrictive assumptions about the activists' rent-production function, f(N a ). The model as it has been developed so far has therefore broad applicability but limited explanatory power. While the validity of Proposition 1 does not depend on the properties of the activists rent-production function 17 , further analysis of the effects of economic policy on the political labor market requires specifying a functional relationship between f(N a ) and the economic output. Activists-supervisors, whose function is to elicit a higher level of effort from fellow workers, can be considered as a sort of labor-augmenting technology.
The activists rent-production function can then be represented as:
where K is capital, L is labor, a is a productivity parameter, F(K,L) is the production function of the economy with the standard properties: F K >0, F L >0, F KK <0, F LL <0, F KL >0.
Under these conditions, the left-hand side of (13) becomes: 
An important implication is that government investment in capital calls for increasing numbers of activists. The intuition behind this result is that with a substantial degree of complementarity between effective labor input and capital, more activists-supervisors have to be hired to elicit additional effort from workers to match an increase in capital. The opposite is true with respect to an increase in the labor force, since activists-supervisors are technically substitutes for crude labor input by assumption. Note also that the marginal effect of an increase in the capital-labor ratio on the magnitude of F L L/F, and consequently on the position of X(N a ) curves, diminishes as the capital-labor ratio increases. This means that the link between investment policy and the recruitment of activists is going to weaken with the accumulation of capital in the economy.
These theoretical statements can be illustrated by the history of the Soviet Union. As Lazarev (2005) shows, the period of forced industrialization, 1928-1940, with its low but rapidly growing 18 Both studies yield the elasticity of substitution around 0.4. Although some authors (see Desai, 1987) find that Soviet postwar economic growth is consistent with unitary elasticity of substitution, elasticity below unity seems to be typical for developing economies. It has been identified, for example, for the South Korean economy (Yuhn, 1992) and many others. Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) find that less developed economies, as a group, are characterized by less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution.
capital-labor ratios, was characterized by record high numbers of activists (new party members). It was the time when the Stalinist hierarchical regime consolidated. By contrast, the "aging" Soviet regime in the 1970s and 1980s that presided over the economy characterized by overinvestment and diminishing returns to capital (see for example Easterly and Fisher 1995) , saw a steady decline in the numbers of activists.
The empirical analysis in the remainder of this paper focuses on the determinants of equilibrium under a stable hierarchical regime. The post-Stalin Soviet Union provides an appropriate testing ground for the proposed model.
III. Data
The dataset used to test the model is a panel of nine states-republics of the former Soviet Union (no reliable data is available for the remaining six). The data cover the period of 1956-1968, roughly coinciding with the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. There were no significant political and economic shocks during this period, and the institutional setting remained largely unchanged.
Institutional setting
Hierarchy. The Soviet Communist party hierarchy nearly mirrored the hierarchy of administrative (territorial) units of the Soviet Union. The major layers in the hierarchy included (from top to bottom): union, republic, oblast, district/independent city/urban district, primary party organization (PPO). The heads of party committees of all levels except the PPO were paid party bureaucrats (bosses in terms of the model). PPOs were typically associated with industrial enterprises.
Secretaries of PPOs were paid only in the largest enterprises. The number of bosses and average boss salaries were largely determined by the size of the constituency and the number of subordinate units (if any). Changes in the administrative (territorial) structure translated typically into the creation and destruction of party bodies and, consequently, into changes in the number of paid positions for party officials. Territorial structure was subject to frequent reshuffling, creating substantial cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the number of paid positions and salaries.
Party membership. The rules of the Soviet Communist party (similar to other communist countries) specified a probation period for new members. During this time, new party recruits were titled candidates. Upon passing the candidate review successfully, they became full party members.
Although the probability of promotion into full membership exceeded 90%, only a small share of the new full members actually remained on party career tracks and was able to reach a position in the party bureaucracy. Bureaucracy accounted for around one percent of the total party membership so that the a priori probability of promotion into the "bosses" (in terms of the model developed in this paper) was of the order of 0.01. The proportion of candidates in the total party membership gradually declined in all republics from about eight to five percent over the period of 1956-69. There was, however, a substantial cross-sectional variation in the rate and even the direction of change in the ratio of party candidates to the total labor force (Figure 3) .
Benefits of party membership. Party membership was normally a prerequisite for appointment to a top managerial position in all spheres of the economy or for pursuing a career in government: civil administration, economic control, or party. A position of a "leading party worker" (party bureaucrat) was of the utmost importance. While rank-and-file party members enjoyed only minor non-pecuniary benefits of membership (such as softer punishment in case of criminal prosecution, preferential right to occupy certain types of jobs, etc.), party bureaucracy received substantial rents in the form of high salaries and fringe benefits. A major part of the party expenditure, according to national party budgets, was geared to provide benefits to paid party officials, the remainder being used to cover operational expenses and to finance propaganda campaigns (Belova and Lazarev 2007) . Salaries of paid party officials constituted only a minor portion of their rents. Fringe benefits (health and child care subsidies, relocation packages, etc.) and non-monetary rewards, such as free housing financed from party budgets, constituted a significant part of their real incomes. Anecdotal evidence suggests a strong correlation between fringe benefits and salaries. This makes salary an accurate indicator of the total party official's remuneration.
Available data
Numbers of candidates and full members are available on the national level for the whole period of the existence of the Soviet communist party. Republic level data are available for 1956-1968. 20 Significant lacunae in the time series restrict the dataset to nine republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In the postStalin years, the candidate probation period was close to one year, so the number of candidates for a given year equals approximately the number of new activists. There is a significant variation in the rates of recruitment across the republics, although the end of the period is marked with convergence, probably due to increasing pressure from the central party leadership.
Communist Party budgets, deposited in the formerly secret party archives, 21 Reliability of the data pertaining to the Communist party is virtually unquestionable since they were collected by the central party administration, were not published (with the exception of bare party membership) or even intended for publication, and were used only by the Central Committee accountants. Reliability of the published Soviet economic data has been often questioned but the dominating position is that the official Soviet statistics was not deliberately distorted, but suffered from the use of idiosyncratic concepts, omissions, and warped presentation -obstacles that are overcome through careful analysis. The data used in this study as they appear in Narodnoe khoziaistvo -in absolute levels -were clearly meant to demonstrate the ever-improving living standards of the population of all Soviet republics. However, simple transformations (first-differenced per capita indicators) produce the panel data that exhibit substantial variation both over time and across republics. 1956-1969.] 24 The Soviet policy of full employment makes labor force practically equivalent to the total employment in industry and state farms. Reported labor force does not include employment in collective farms, around one fifth of the total working-age population in the period of this study.
(See Table 3 ) This suggests that the available data had not been purposefully manipulated before publication.
IV. Empirical implementation and estimation results
Empirical specification
The following assumptions need to be made to relate the available data series to the model 25 Total enrollment is equivalent to the number of "promotion tickets" available to the population outside of the party promotion machine. Although party membership was a plus for a college applicant, it was not a prerequisite for admission and higher education is therefore a distinct alternative to activist service. The model variables in (16) need to be replaced with actual data series as described earlier in this section. Since N a and N b are shares (ratios of absolute numbers of activists and bosses respectively and total labor, L), (16) needs to be rewritten in terms of absolute numbers with all the terms for labor collected together to avoid spurious correlation. In addition, it is desirable to use first-order log differences in order to exclude the time trend and fixed effects.
The complete empirical specification is given by:
In the expression above, A it is the absolute number of activists and B it is the absolute number of bosses.
I it replaces K/L in the prototype specification (16) and is alternatively log of investment per worker, ln(I/L), or the change in investment rate, ∆ ln(I/Y).
Labor force, L it , is present in (17) as the denominator for the other variables (except for investment, I it , and physicians per capita, PH it , which comes originally in per capita terms). The theoretical model deals with the numbers of activists and bosses as shares of labor force, and the wage (retail sales divided by labor). Enrollment and housing also should be measured with respect to the total labor force. Therefore, the net effect of the labor force is given by:
This net effect should equal zero if the linearized model (16) is sufficiently accurate and the proxies for the change in capital-labor ratio are adequate. Predictions of the promotion contract model with respect to the empirical specification (17) are summarized in Table 1 .
Estimation results
The model (17) is estimated using the feasible GLS method with three error term specifications: random effects, cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional correlation. Both proxies for the change in capital-labor ratio produce similar results (reported in Table 2 ), with the exception of the effect of investment itself, which has higher significance if log change in investment rate is used (columns (4-6) in Table 2 ). All these estimates are robust with respect to sample composition. In particular, truncation of the time period on either or both sides or removal of one to four cross-sections at random does not affect the sign and the order of magnitude of any parameter estimate. Experimenting with various subperiod dummies shows that an additional constant for the years after 1961 improves the results most significantly. Only estimates with the After_1961 dummy are reported in Table 2 .
The signs and magnitudes of the parameter estimates are consistent with the promotion contract model. The number of bosses, N b , has a positive coefficient as expected. The boss rent (party salaries), R, also has a positive effect, although its significance is low. Signs and magnitudes of both investment indicators are consistent with the production technology with low elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Net effects of labor force, insignificantly different from zero, suggests that linearized model (17) is appropriate. The variables that measure public consumption -enrollment in higher education institutions, ST, new public housing construction, NH, and physicians per capita, PH,
-also have expected signs or are insignificant (NH). These effects provide additional support for the theoretical result that the real wages of the working population (broadly conceived) should have a destimulating effect on the supply of activists. Enrollment, ST, can be also interpreted as an indicator of the availability of alternative opportunities for vertical income mobility which was not introduced explicitly in the theoretical model. The negative effect of this variable is in agreement with this interpretation. It can be argued, however, that the rulers value an educated 'cadre' and, therefore, a higher educational attainment increases the chances of promotion and/or is a reward for extra effort.
This contradicts the alternative-opportunity function of higher education. The low significance of ST in most specifications can be, therefore, considered as resulting from the counteraction of the two effects of the higher education on the incentives to join the ranks of activists. Finally, significant negative estimates of the After_1961 dummy can be explained by the elevated expectations of promotion on the part of the activists due to the temporary increase in the rate of turnover within the Soviet party bureaucracy in 1956-61, when Stalin's cohort of bosses was largely forced to retire.
A distinctive feature of the results is the higher significance of variables that correspond to the negative stimuli to become an activist (retail sales, enrollment in higher education, etc.) versus low significance of positive ones (the number of bosses and their average salary). The contribution of the latter into the explained variation is one order of magnitude lower than that of the former. Although the proxy for the boss rent used here -salary -accounts for only a portion of the total remuneration of the bureaucrats, there might be a more general explanation for the relative strength of the "push" of low wages versus the "pull" of expected rents. The variables that determine the latter are far from perfectly observable by a worker considering the choice to become an activist. The information on the number of positions in the bureaucracy and the bosses' salaries and benefits is hardly public domain under any non-democratic regime. The information can only be acquired indirectly and is easily distorted in transmission. It is not surprising therefore that the supply of activists is more elastic with respect to the workers' consumption than the boss rent. This implies that future empirical research on hierarchical regimes is unlikely to be significantly hampered by the lack of access to the data that pertain to the opaque higher tiers of the ruling bureaucracies, as long as relevant economic variables can be observed.
In part, these results reconfirm earlier findings by Schnytzer and Sustersic (1998) for the former Yugoslavia. The essence of their findings is that the lower wages and employment, the higher the supply of activists, as revealed in the party recruitment rates. The negative treatment effect of the post-1961 period, however, indirectly contradicts the positive effect of repression on the support for the regime identified by these authors, since it was the period of 1956-61 that was characterized by more liberal policies in the Soviet Union. Results in this paper are also in general agreement with the results of the cross-country studies by Feng and Zak (1999) and Barro (1999) , although it is hard to compare the findings directly due to the differences in the composition of the datasets. Both studies reveal a positive correlation between low inequality and a high level of education with the probability of democratic transitions (the former) or propensity for democracy (the latter). These results are consistent with our assumption of the rent-maximizing rulers and the rational population, responsive to promotion incentives. The analysis in this paper, however, indicates that both sides of the political labor market influence the observed outcomes significantly. Economic incentives for both incumbent bureaucrats and activists determine the equilibrium number of party candidates under a hierarchical regime.
V. Conclusion
Collective control rights over the economy, as opposed to private property rights, create the possibilities for the rulers in a political hierarchy to "borrow" support and rent-augmenting services of the activists in exchange for promises of deferred promotion. Institutional forms that facilitate the political-economic exchange of this type vary historically and across countries. What they all have in common is the turnover within the hierarchical ruling stratum and implicit promotion contracts that provide participation incentives for both the workers and the rulers. Efficiency of this exchange is a function of the income gap between workers and rulers. The more thorough the governmental control over the paths of upward income mobility in society, the closer its position is to the monopsony in the political labor market, the more rents the rulers can capture. The efficiency depends also on production technology. Activists' supervisory service is essentially a labor-augmenting technology. In an economy with low elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, this produces a positive correlation between the rulers' demand for activists and public investment. 
Mathematical Appendix
A. Properties of the isorent and the activists participation constraint
The inverse of the rent-production function f -1 () is an increasing and convex function since f() 
B. Proof of Proposition 1.
It follows from the properties of the activists participation constraint discussed (see Appendix A) that its inverse, T(N a ), has the following properties:
Let us show that Y(T) has the following properties: where β 1 > 0, β 2 > 0, 0 < β 3 < 1, as follows from (22) and (23). Labor force, net effect 0 Table 2 . Estimation results.
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